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Abstract—Automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems are
possible to fool via targeted adversarial examples. These can
induce the ASR to produce arbitrary transcriptions in response
to any type of audio signal, be it speech, environmental sounds,
or music. However, in general, those adversarial examples did
not work in a real-world setup, where the examples are played
over the air but have to be fed into the ASR system directly. In
some cases, where the adversarial examples could be successfully
played over the air, the attacks require precise information about
the room where the attack takes place in order to tailor the
adversarial examples to a specific setup and are therefore not
transferable to other rooms. Other attacks, which are robust in
an over-the-air attack, are either handcrafted examples or human
listeners can easily recognize the target transcription, once they
have been alerted to its content.
In this paper, we demonstrate the first generic algorithm
that produces adversarial examples which remain robust in
an over-the-air attack such that the ASR system transcribes
the target transcription after actually being replayed. For the
proposed algorithm, guessing a rough approximation of the room
characteristics is enough and no actual access to the room is
required. We use the ASR system Kaldi to demonstrate an
end-to-end attack and employ a room-impulse-response (RIR)
simulator to harden the adversarial examples against varying
room characteristics. Further, the algorithm can also utilize
psychoacoustics to hide most of the changes of the original
audio signal below the human thresholds of hearing. We show
that the adversarial examples work for varying room setups,
but also can be tailored to specific room setups. As a result,
an attacker can optimize adversarial examples for any kind of
target transcription and to arbitrary room setups. Additionally,
the adversarial examples remain transferable to varying room
conditions with a high probability.
Index Terms—audio adversarial examples, automatic speech
recognition, over-the-air attack
I. INTRODUCTION
In restless dreams I walked alone. Narrow streets of
cobblestone. ’Neath the halo of a streetlamp. I turned
my collar to the cold and damp. When my eyes were
stabbed by the flash of a neon light. That split the
night. And touched the sound of silence.
Simon & Garfunkel, The Sound of Silence
Adversarial examples have been shown to represent a threat
for state-of-the-art automatic speech recognition (ASR) sys-
tems. More specifically, several recent works have demon-
strated that it is possible to fool different kinds of ASR
systems [1]–[4]. Such attacks were demonstrated against both
connectionist temporal classification (CTC) loss ASR systems
as well as DNN-HMM systems, which are hybrids using a
ASR
”HELLO DARKNESS
MY OLD FRIEND”
xh transcription
h
x
Fig. 1. For an over-the-air attack against automatic speech recognition (ASR)
systems, the attack needs to remain robust after the transmission through a
room, which can be modeled as a convolution of the original audio signal x
with the room-dependent room impulse response (RIR) h.
combination of deep neural networks (DNNs) and hidden
Markov models (HMMs) in a joint system.
The practical implications and real-world impact of the
demonstrated attacks are unclear at the moment. On the one
hand, earlier work only feed the audio adversarial directly into
to ASR system [1]–[3], hence ignoring all the side effects (e.g.,
reflections or echo) of a real-world, end-to-end attack. On the
other hand, some works demonstrated adversarial examples
that can be played over-the-air [5], [6], but these proof-of-
concept attacks are specifically tailored for one specific, static
room setup or are hard to reproduce with a proven success
rate in a different environment. We also note that when over-
the-air adversarial examples, used against black-box systems,
the target transcription is easy to perceive for human listeners,
once the intended attack is known.
We argue that adversarial examples for ASR systems can
only be considered as a real threat if the targeted recognition
is produced even when the signal is played over the air.
Due to the high variability of possible room setups and the
induced distortions, it is very hard to create robust adversarial
examples, which work for a large subset of possible acoustic
conditions. Depending on the attack scenario, an attacker can
use some prior knowledge, e. g., if the attack is broadcasted
via TV commercials, an attacker can try to estimate the actual
room geometry and size. For this, the room impulse response
(RIR), which describes the transmission of an acoustic signal
in a room [7], needs to be taken into account. The transmission
can be modeled as a convolution of the original audio signal
with room-dependent RIR (see Figure 1 for an illustration),
where the RIR depends on various factors. In practice, it is
nearly impossible to estimate an exact RIR without having
access to the actual room. Therefore, robust adversarial ex-
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amples need to take a range of possible RIRs into account to
increase the success rate.
The first adversarial audio examples that are imperceptible
by humans even if they know the target transcription have been
described by Carlini and Wagner [1]. Other approaches [3],
[4] have been successful at embedding the changes below the
human threshold of hearing, which makes it much harder to
detect an adversarial audio file. On the downside, in all of these
cases, the attack was not successful when played over-the-air
instead of being directly fed into the ASR system.
Other approaches, which did work over the air, have only
been tested in a static setup (i.e., fixed position of speaker
and microphone with a fixed distance). Yakura’s and Sakuma’s
approach can hide the target transcription but requires physical
access to the room, which limits their attack to one very
specific room setup [8]. Concurrently, Szurley and Kolter
published room-dependent robust adversarial examples, which
even worked under constraints given by a psychoacoustic
model [9]. However, their adversarial examples have only
worked in an anechoic chamber (a room designed to absorb
reflections). The attack can, therefore, not be compared with
a real-world scenario, as the recorded audio signal in an
anechoic chamber corresponds to the direct sound with only
very minor changes. In other successful over-the-air attacks,
human listeners can easily recognize the target transcription
once they are alerted to its content [5], [6].
In the visual domain, Athalye and Sutskever presented
a real-world adversarial perturbation on a 3D-printed turtle,
which is recognized as a rifle from almost every point of
view [10]. The algorithm to create this 3D object not only
minimizes the distortion for one image, but for all possible
projections of a 3D object into a 2D image. We borrow the idea
of this approach and transfer it to the audio domain, replacing
the projections by convolutions with RIRs and thereby harden
the audio adversarial example against the transmission through
varying rooms.
More specifically, we introduce in this paper a generic and
robust approach to generate over-the-air adversarial examples
against ASR systems by utilizing an RIR generator to sample
from different room setups. For the simulation, the convolution
with the sampled RIR is added to the DNN as an additional
layer, which enables us to update the original audio signal
directly under the constraints given by the simulated RIR. For
this, the RIRs are drawn out of a distribution of room setups
to simulate the over-the-air attack. The algorithm is repeated
until the target transcription is recognized or a maximum
number of iterations is reached. Using this approach, the
adversarial examples are hardened to remain robust in real
over-the-air attacks across various room setups. We also show
an improvement that is based on psychoacoustic hiding [11],
by including hearing thresholds in the backpropagation, as
proposed by Scho¨nherr et al [3].
We have implemented the proposed algorithm to attack
the DNN-HMM ASR system Kaldi [12] under varying room
conditions. The attack works in both cases, with and without
psychoacoustic hiding. In either case, we can produce success-
ful robust adversarial examples. With the generic approach that
we have implemented, it is possible to induce an arbitrary
target transcription and the attacker does not need physical
access to the room where the attack takes place. We show
that for a successful attack, a rough estimation of the room
geometry and audio decay time is enough and the adversarial
examples still continue to work if the real setup actually differs
from the approximation.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper:
• Over-the-air attack. We propose an approach to generate
robust over-the-air adversarial examples for DNN-HMM-
based ASR systems. The attack uses a DNN convolution
layer to simulate the effect of RIRs, which allows us to
back-propagate gradients directly to the raw audio signal.
• Psychoacoustics. We show that the attack can be com-
bined with psychoacoustics for hiding transcriptions in
arbitrary audio files.
• Performance Analysis. We measure the accuracy of the
adversarial attack and the degree of perturbation of the
audio signal, both with and without hearing thresholds.
A demonstration of our attack is available online at http:
//ota-adversarial-examples.selfip.org where we present several
adversarial audio files, which have been successful when
played over-the-air.
II. BACKGROUND
In the following, we provide an overview of the ASR system
that was used in the attack and describe the general approach to
calculate audio adversarial examples. Furthermore, we discuss
how room simulation can be performed with the help of
RIRs and briefly introduce the necessary background from
psychoacoustics to understand the rest of this paper.
A. Automatic Speech Recognition
We chose the open-source toolkit Kaldi [12] as our ASR
system, also employing the extension to create adversarial
examples that is provided by Scho¨nherr et al. [3].
The DNN-HMM-based ASR system can be divided into
three parts: the feature extraction, which transforms the raw
input data into representative features (so-called pseudo-
posteriors), the DNN as the acoustic model of the system, and
the decoding step, which returns the recognized transcription.
In Scho¨nherr et al.’s approach, The feature extraction is
integrated into the DNN, which enables us to change the raw
audio file directly when creating the adversarial example. The
approach is shown in Figure 2.
B. Audio Adversarial Examples
The ASR system can be described as a function
y = arg max
y˜
P (y˜|x) = f(x), (1)
mapping some audio signal x to its corresponding, most likely
transcription y. By modifying the original input
x′ = x+ δ, such that f(x) 6= f(x′), (2)
Feature Extraction DNN
audio-
waveform
pseudo-
posteriors
x(0)
. . .
. . .
x(N−1)
χ = fP (xh) P (y|x) = f(χ)
Fig. 2. Augmented DNN, which gets the raw audio as its input and integrates
the feature extraction into the recognizer’s DNN. This enables to change the
raw audio signal directly via gradient descent.
an adversarial example can be obtained. Here, δ can also
be restricted, e. g., via hearing thresholds. In this work, only
targeted attacks are considered, where the target transcrip-
tion y′ != f(x′) is defined. The optimization can, therefore,
be described as
x′ = arg max
x˜
P (y′|x˜). (3)
To calculate over-the-air-robust adversarial examples, we
used the implementation of Scho¨nherr et al. [3]. The system
can be divided into three steps: (i) To get the best possible
starting point, forced alignment is used to find the optimal
pseudo-posterior matrix (representation of the output of the
DNN, before the decoding step) for the given audio file and
target transcription. (ii) By integration the feature extraction
into the DNN, the audio data can be updated directly via
gradient descent and (iii) with hearing thresholds, which
depend on the original audio file, the added noise is limited
to time-frequency ranges, where it is not (or only barely)
perceptible by humans.
In the following, we extend this system in order to harden
the adversarial examples against the effect of the audio signal
transmission through air, which is modeled via the application
of an RIR.
C. Room Impulse Response
When the signal is transmitted through a room, as visualized
in Figures 1 and 3, the recorded signal can be computed by
convolving the room’s impulse response h with the original
audio signal x according to
xh = x ∗ h. (4)
Here, the convolution operator ∗ is a shorthand notation for
xh(n) =
n∑
m=n−M+1
x(m) · h(n−m)
with n = 0, . . . , N − 1,
(5)
where N is the length of the audio signal, M the length of
the RIR h, and all x(n) with n < 0 are assumed to be zero.
In general, the RIR h depends on the size of the room, on
the positions of the source and the receiver, and on other room
characteristics such as the sound reflection properties of the
walls, ceiling, floor, and of any furniture or other contents of
the room. Therefore, the audio signal that is received by the
ASR system is never identical to the original audio and an
exact RIR is very hard to predict. We will describe a possible
solution after the next section.
D. Psychoacoustics
Psychoacoustics has been shown to yield an appropriate
measure of (in-)audibility for the calculation of audio ad-
versarial examples [3], [4]. Psychoacoustic hearing thresholds
describe how the dependencies between frequencies and across
time lead to masking effects in human perception [11]. Proba-
bly the best-known example for an application of these effects
is found in MP3 compression [13], where the compression
algorithm applies a set of empirical hearing thresholds to the
input signal. The original input signal can be transformed
into a smaller but lossy representation by encoding the sig-
nal, dependent on hearing thresholds. More specifically, the
imperceptible bands are encoded with a very low resolution
in comparison to the perceptible bands.
In psychoacoustic adversarial examples, inspired by these
methods, the psychoacoustic hearing thresholds are used to
limit the changes in the audio signal to time-frequency-areas,
where the noise is not, or barely, perceptible by humans.
III. OVER-THE-AIR ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
We extend the optimization algorithm of Scho¨nherr et al. [3]
to produce robust audio adversarial examples, which still func-
tion as intended even after transmission from a loudspeaker to
a microphone in a real room environment. For this purpose,
we simulate different RIRs and use those in an iterative
algorithm to harden the adversarial examples against the signal
modifications that are incurred during playback and recording.
A. Adversary Model
Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume the following
adversary model. First, we assume a white-box attack, where
the adversary knows the attacked ASR system with all of
its model parameters. This requirement is in line with prior
work on this topic [3]. Using this knowledge, the attacker
generates audio samples containing malicious perturbations
before the actual attack takes place, i. e., the attacker exploits
the ASR system to create an audio file that produces the
desired recognition result. Additionally, we assume that the
trained ASR system, including the DNN, remains unchanged
over time. Finally, we assume that the adversarial examples
are played over the air via loudspeakers. Note that we only
consider targeted attacks, where the target transcription is
predefined (i.e., the adversary chooses the target sentence).
B. Room Impulse Response Simulator
For the RIR simulation, we use the AudioLabs implemen-
tation of the image method from Allen and Berkley [7].
The simulator takes the room dimensions, the audio decay
time T60, and the source and receiver position as its input and
calculates the corresponding RIR for the given parameters.
bz rz
sz
bx
rx
sx
b
y
ry
sy
T60
Fig. 3. The room simulation model. We assume a probability distribution
over all possible rooms by defining relevant simulation parameters like
e.g. the room geometry, T60 time due to numerical problems, source, and
receiver positions as random variables. To optimize our over-the-air adversarial
examples we sample from this distribution to get a variety of possible RIRs.
For the simulation, we use a cuboid-shaped room, which can
be described via its length, width and height, b = [bx, by, bz].
In addition to this, the simulation also requires the three-
dimensional source position s = [sx, sy, sz], receiver posi-
tion r = [rx, ry, rz], and the audio decay time T60, which
results in 10 freely selectable parameters. All parameters are
also sketched in Figure 3.
In order to sample random RIRs, we assume b, the audio
decay time T60, s, and r to be random variables. We draw
each of these 10 values from a uniform distribution between
a minimum and a maximum allowed value. For the room
size and for T60, the minimum and the maximum values can
be chosen arbitrarily. After those parameters are drawn, the
ranges for source and receiver positions are drawn next, in
a range from zero to the dimensions of the virtual room, to
make sure that the source and the receiver are located inside
the room. To simplify the notation, in the following, we use
the 10-dimensional parameter vector θ to describe the room
dimensions b, the position of the source s and receiver r, and
the audio decay time T60. An example of a simulated RIR in
the time and the frequency domain is shown in Figure 4.
The RIR h can, therefore, be considered as a sample of the
distribution Hθ. For some combinations of parameters, it is
not possible to calculate an RIR with the chosen T60. In those
cases, we sample a new T60 from the same distribution.
C. Robust Audio Adversarial Examples
In contrast to approaches that feed adversarial examples
directly into the ASR system [1], [3], we include the presence
of changing room characteristics, in the form of RIRs, in the
optimization problem. This hardened the adversarial examples
to remain robust in an over-the-air attack.
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Fig. 4. Simulated RIR for b = [8m, 7m, 2.8m], s = [3.9m, 3.4m, 1.2m]
and r = [1.4m, 1.8m, 1.2m], and T60 = 0.3 in the time domain (top) and
the frequency domain (bottom).
For the calculation of an adversarial example, we extend the
optimization criterion given in (3) via
x′ = arg max
x˜
Eh∼Hθ [P (y′|x˜h)]. (6)
This approach is borrowed from the Expectation Over Trans-
formation (EOT) approach in the visual domain, where it is
used to consider different two- and three-dimensional transfor-
mations, which has led to successful real-world adversarial ex-
amples [10]. In our case, instead of visual transformations, we
use the convolution with RIRs, drawn from Hθ, to maximize
the expectation over varying RIRs as shown in Equation (6).
For the implementation, we use a DNN that already has
been augmented to include the feature extraction, and we
additionally prepend a convolutional layer to the DNN. This
layer simulates the convolution with the RIR h to model
the transmission through the room. We need this convolution
to be integrated as a layer in the DNN in order to enable
the algorithm to apply gradient descent to the time-domain
audio signal (before playback), similar to the integration of
the feature extraction into the DNN in prior work [3].
The leftmost part, the RIR simulation layer, is only used for
the calculation of adversarial examples and removed during
testing, as the actual (either simulated or physical) RIR will
then act during the (simulate or real) transmission over the air.
An overview of the proposed DNN is given in Figure 5,
where the first part (’Convolution’) describes the convolution
with the RIR h and the center and right part (’Feature
extraction’ and ’DNN’) show the feature extraction and the
acoustic model DNN, which is used to obtain the pseudo-
posteriors for the decoding stage.
The inclusion of the convolution as a layer in the DNN
requires the layer to be differentiable. Using (5), the derivative
can be written as
∂xh(n)
∂x(m)
= h(n−m) ∀n,m, (7)
Convolution Feature
Extraction
DNN
audio-
waveform
pseudo-
posteriors
x(n)
. . .
x(n−M+2)
x(n−M+1)
χ = fP (xh) P (y|x) = f(χ)xh = x ∗ h
h
Fig. 5. To simulate any RIR and to update the time domain audio signal
directly, the RIR is integrated as an additional layer into the DNN.
or written as Jacobian Matrix
∂xh
∂x
=

∂xh(0)
∂x(1−M)
∂xh(1)
∂x(2−M) . . .
∂xh(N−1)
∂x(N−M)
∂xh(0)
∂x(2−M)
∂xh(1)
∂x(3−M) . . .
∂xh(N−1)
∂x(N−(M−1))
...
...
. . .
...
∂xh(0)
∂x(0)
∂xh(1)
∂x(1) . . .
∂xh(N−1)
∂x(N−1)
 (8)
=

h(M − 1) h(M − 1) . . . h(M − 1)
h(M − 2) h(M − 2) . . . h(M − 2)
...
...
. . .
...
h(0) h(0) . . . h(0)
 . (9)
This can be integrated into the gradient descent step for the
calculation of the gradient ∇x via
∇x = ∂L(y, y
′)
∂f(χ)
· ∂f(χ)
∂fp(xh)
· ∂fp(xh)
∂xh
· ∂xh
∂x
, (10)
where the function fp(·) describes the feature extraction. This
is an extension of the prior approach [3], where
∇x = ∂L(y, y
′)
∂f(χ)
· ∂f(χ)
∂fp(x)
· ∂fp(x)
∂x
(11)
is defined for the calculation of adversarial examples via
gradient descent with the objective function L(·).
D. Over-the-air Adversarial Examples
To verify the hardened over-the-air adversarial attack, the
adversarial examples x′ have to be played back via a loud-
speaker and the recorded audio signals must be used to
determine the accuracy.
For the calculation, we realized the optimization criterion,
defined in (6), by sampling a new RIR h after every Q
gradient descent iterations. This simulates different rooms
and recording conditions. Therefore, the adversarial example
depends on the distribution Hθ from which the RIR h is drawn.
After each gradient descent step, the audio signal x′ is updated
via the calculated gradient ∇x and the learning rate α.
The total maximum number of iterations is limited to at
most G iterations. However, if a robust adversarial example is
created before the maximum number of iterations is reached,
the algorithm does not need to continue. To efficiently cal-
culate adversarial examples, we used a measured RIR htest
to simulate the over-the-air scenario during the calculation to
verify whether the example has already achieved over-the-air
Algorithm 1 Calculation of robust over-the-air adversarial
examples via switching RIRs.
1: input: original audio x, target transcription y′, hearing
thresholds Φ, distribution Hθ
2: result: robust adversarial example x′
3: initialize: g ← 0, x′ ← x
4: while g < G and y 6= y′ do
5: g ← g + 1
6: draw random sample h ∼ Hθ
7: update first layer of DNN with h
8: for 0 to Q do
9: ∇x← gradient descent, constrained by Φ in case
of psychoacoustic masking
10: x′ ← x′ + α · ∇x
11: x′h ← x′ ∗ htest
12: y ← decode(x′h) with DNN0
robustness. The RIR htest was only used for the verification
and it was not applied during the gradient descent step, to not
adjust the adversarial examples to the real RIR.
The entire approach is given in Algorithm 1. As can be
seen, the psychoacoustic hearing thresholds Φ are also used
during the gradient descent to limit the modifications of the
signal to those time-frequency ranges, where they are (mostly)
imperceptible. DNN0 describes the augmented DNN (feature
extraction and acoustic DNN) in Figure 2 without the RIR
simulation since, for the algorithm, this is replaced by the
simulated RIR htest.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We measured the performance of the algorithm for sim-
ulated and real over-the-air attacks, both for unrestricted
adversarial examples and for adversarial examples restricted
by the psychoacoustic hearing thresholds.
A. Metrics
We used the following standard measures to assess the
quality of the robust adversarial examples.
1) Word Error Rate: To measure performance, we used the
word error rate (WER) with respect to the target transcrip-
tion. The standard metric for this purpose, the Levenshtein
distance [14] L, is used here. It counts the number of deleted
D, inserted I , and substituted S words, and it is divided by
to the total number of words N to obtain
WER = 100 · L
N
= 100 · D + I + S
N
. (12)
For a real attack, an adversarial example can only be
counted as a success if a WER of 0 % is achieved. Therefore,
we also determined the number of adversarial examples that
had been decoded without any errors.
Fig. 6. 360 degree panorama shot of the lab room setup used for the over-the-air recordings. The green dashed circle shows the microphone position and
the red solid circle shows the loudspeaker position.
2) Segmental Signal-to-Noise Ratio: The segmental signal-
to-noise ratio (SNRseg) measures the amount of noise σ added
to the original signal x and is computed via
SNRseg(dB) =
10
K
K−1∑
k=0
log10
∑Tk+T−1
t=Tk x
2(t)∑Tk+T−1
t=Tk σ
2(t)
, (13)
where T is the segment length and K the number of segments.
Thus, the higher the SNRseg, the less noise was added.
In contrast to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the
SNRseg [15] is performed frame-wise and gives a better
assessment of an audio signal if the original and the added
noise are aligned [16].
We use a window length of 16 ms which corresponds to
K = 256 at a sampling frequency of 16 kHz.
B. Evaluation
For the evaluation, we used 100 audio samples, all contain-
ing eight seconds of music. For this, we compared different
lengths M for the RIR (512 and 1024 samples) and evaluated
the effect of the use of hearing thresholds and of different room
configurations. For the hearing thresholds, we employed the
most promising version of prior attacks [3], which allows the
modifications to the signal to exceed the exact hearing thresh-
olds by 20 dB. For the further parameters, we set G = 2000
and Q = 10. All experiments were performed on a machine
with two Intel Xeon E5-2670 v3 CPUs and 128 GB of DDR4
memory.
C. Simulated Over-the-Air Attack
The results in Table II are calculated with Algorithm 1.
The WER is measured for a simulated over-the-air attack
using a measured RIR. For this, we used two different dis-
tributions H . The approximate dimensions of the real room
that was used in the evaluation, are breal ≈ [8 m, 7 m, 2.8 m]
with T60,real ≈ 0.3 ms. For the two sampling distributions
of the simulated rooms, Hθ1 and Hθ2 , the parameters are
shown in Table I. Hθ2 simulates a tighter approximation of
the actual room dimensions and Hθ1 broader one. We use
these different versions to evaluate how tight the room needs
to be approximated for a successful over-the-air attack.
Note that even if the WER seems to be high, for an attacker
one successful adversarial example with 0 % WER would be
enough, which is indeed possible, also for real over-the-air
examples, which will be shown in the next section.
TABLE I
RANGE OF ROOM DIMENSIONS FOR THE SAMPLING DISTRIBUTIONS Hθ1
AND Hθ2 .
Hθ1 Hθ2
min max min max
bx 6.0 m 10.0 m 7.0 m 9.0 m
by 5.0 m 9.0 m 6.0 m 8.0 m
bz 3.0 m 5.0 m 2.5 m 3.0 m
T60 0.2 s 0.6 s 0.2 s 0.4 s
TABLE II
WER AND SNRSEG FOR SIMULATED OVER-THE-AIR ATTACKS FOR
DIFFERENT ROOM CONFIGURATIONS (Hθ1 AND Hθ2 ). M IS THE LENGTH
OF THE SIMULATED RIRS, RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT
PSYCHOACOUSTIC MASKING ARE SHOWN FOR G = 2000.
M = 512 M = 1024
WER SNRseg in dB WER SNRseg in dB
Hθ1
w/o thresh. 66.7 % 12.97±3.91 68.7 % 12.89±4.30
w/ thresh. 82.0 % 15.72±4.25 82.3 % 16.03±4.35
Hθ2
w/o thresh. 66.7 % 13.23±4.22 66.0 % 13.28±4.10
w/ thresh. 76.7 % 16.10±4.01 79.0 % 16.21±4.28
The SNRseg in Table II is calculated after applying the same
measured RIR to both the original signal and the adversarial
examples. We chose this approach since this is also the signal
that is perceived by human listeners if the adversarial examples
are played over the air.
The SNRseg appears fairly low in general, which indicates
that on average more noise has to be added in comparison
to adversarial examples which are not hardened to work over
the air. However, the adversarial examples that were restricted
by the hearing thresholds have a better SNRseg. Also, in
the successful cases of real over-the-air adversarial examples
discussed in the next section, those examples, which were
restricted via the hearing thresholds, show a better SNRseg.
Additionally, as SNRseg measures any added noise, and not
only the perceptible noise components, the perceptible noise is
even lower than SNRseg would suggest for the versions where
hearing thresholds are used.
In Figure 7, the WER is plotted as a function of the number
of iterations G. Even though the WER may further improve
in some cases, we have limited the maximum number of
iterations to 2000 due to computational reasons. Also, in most
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Fig. 7. WERs for simulated over-the-air attacks plotted as a function of the number of iterations G for 100 adversarial examples.
TABLE III
WER FOR REAL OVER-THE-AIR ATTACKS WITH DIFFERENT ROOM
CONFIGURATIONS, LENGTHS OF SIMULATED RIRS, WITH & WITHOUT
HEARING THRESHOLDS, FOR G = 2000.
M = 512 M = 1024
WER WER
Hθ1
w/o thresh. 71.1 % 72.7 %
w/ thresh. 88.2 % 82.4 %
Hθ2
w/o thresh. 70.7 % 66.3 %
w/ thresh. 81.0 % 81.0 %
of the cases, after 1000 iterations, the WER did not decrease
nearly as rapidly as for the first 1000 iterations.
D. Real End-to-End Over-the-Air Attack
The results for real over-the-air attacks are shown in
Table III. These were obtained using the same adversarial
examples that were evaluated for the simulated playback in
Table II, but after these were replayed in the actual lab room
setup described above, with sreal = [3.9 m, 3.4 m, 1.2 m] and
rreal = [1.4 m, 1.8 m, 1.2 m]. A 360 degree panorama shot of
the lab room setup is shown in Figure 6 with the position of
the microphone marked by the green dashed circle and the
position of the loudspeaker by the solid red circle.
Some of the 100 considered audio samples, especially
without the use of hearing thresholds, clipped too much.
As it would not be possible to replay those examples, we
removed the adversarial examples for the actual over-the-
air attack. Each of the remaining adversarial examples was
played back five times. We were also possible to transcribe
adversarial examples with 0 % WER. Depending on the setup,
the measured success rate was up to 3.7 % of the utterances
for the cases with hearing thresholds (Hθ2 and M = 1024)
and up to 1.8 % of the utterances without hearing thresholds
(Hθ2 and M = 512).
The comparison of the WERs in Table II and Table III
shows that the simulated attack gives a sufficient prediction
of the expected WER. The largest difference of the WER
between the simulated and the real case is 6.2 % (Hθ1 and
M = 512 with hearing thresholds), and on average, the
TABLE IV
WER FOR REAL OVER-THE-AIR ATTACKS IN DIFFERENT ROOMS WITH
AND WITHOUT HEARING THRESHOLDS FOR M = 1024 AND G = 2000.
Room I Room II
WER WER
Hθ1
w/o thresh. 78.0 % 72.0 %
w/ thresh. 89.7 % 82.5 %
Hθ2
w/o thresh. 80.0 % 74.6 %
w/ thresh. 87.2 % 87.8 %
difference is only 3.2 %. Also, for the adversarial examples
with 0 % WER in the simulated attacks the real attacks are
more likely to be successful. This shows, that the simulation
is a reliable predictor for how successful an attack would
be in the real world. Some of those examples are shown at
http://ota-adversarial-examples.selfip.org.
E. Varying Room Setups
To measure the robustness for cases where the room charac-
teristics differ from the simulated room setup—which is also
used to calculate the robust adversarial examples—we used the
best versions with and without hearing thresholds and replayed
those in different real room setups. For these experiments, we
used the setup with M = 1024, which led to the best WER in
the real over-the-air attack in Table III. The results are shown
in Table IV.
The experiments in Room I and Room II are performed
in the same room as the experiments shown in Table III,
but with a modified T60 time for Room I, and a changed
receiver and source position for Room II, with sroomII =
[1.9 m, 4.6 m, 1.2 m] and rroomII = [5.2 m, 3.4 m, 1.2 m]. The
results for Room II should therefore not significantly change
since the algorithm already varies the position on the source
and the receiver. This is indeed the case for θ1, but for θ2 the
WER increases. Nevertheless, the results are still reasonable
and the total number of successful trials is still similar.
In general, the results remain equal for all cases and as
expected, for θ1, the results are more robust against varying
conditions as this is the less specifically tailored version.
V. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks on ASR systems focus either on hiding a
target transcription [5], [6] or on obfuscating the original tran-
scription [17]. Almost all previous works on attacks against
ASR systems did not focus on real-world attacks [5], [18], [19]
or were only successful for simulated over-the-air attacks [4].
A. Audio Adversarial Example
Carlini et al. have shown that targeted attacks against HMM-
only ASR systems are possible [5]. They use an inverse feature
extraction to create adversarial audio samples. However, the
resulting audio samples are not intelligible by humans in most
of the cases and may be considered as noise, but may make
thoughtful listeners suspicious.
A different approach was shown by Vaidya et al. [19],
where the authors changed an input signal to fit the target
transcription by considering the features instead of the output
of the DNN. Nevertheless, the results show high distortions of
the audio signal and can easily be detected by a human.
An approach to overcome this limitation was proposed by
Zhang et al. They have shown that an adversary can hide
a transcription by utilizing non-linearities of microphones to
modulate the baseband audio signals with ultrasound above
20 kHz [18]. The main downside of the attack is the fact that
the information of the necessary features needs to be retrieved
from the audio signal, recorded with the specific microphone,
which is costly in practice. Song and Mittael [20] and Roy
et al. [21] introduced similar ultrasound-based attacks that are
not adversarial examples, but rather interact with the ASR
system in a frequency range inaudible to humans.
Carlini and Wagner published a work in which they in-
troduce a general targeted attack on ASR systems using
CTC-loss [1]. The attack is based on a gradient-descent-
based minimization [22] (as used in previous image classi-
fication adversarial attacks), but the adversarial examples are
fed directly into the recognizer. CommanderSong [2] is also
evaluated against Kaldi and uses backpropagation to find an
adversarial example. However, the very limited over-the-air
attack highly depends on the speakers and recording devices
as the attack parameters have to be adjusted especially for
these components. Yakura and Sakuma published a technical
report, which describes an algorithm to create over-the-air
robust adversarial examples, but with the limitation that it
is necessary to have physical access to the room where the
attack takes place [8]. Also, they did not evaluate their room-
dependent results for varying room conditions. Concurrently,
Szuley and Kolter also published a work on room-dependent
robust adversarial examples, which worked under constraints
given by a psychoacoustic model [9]. However, their adver-
sarial examples have only worked in an anechoic chamber, a
room that is designed specifically to eliminate the effect of an
RIR. The attack can, therefore, not be compared with a real-
world scenario as the audio signal is limited almost completely
to the direct sound.
B. Psychoacoustic Hiding
Scho¨nherr et al. published an approach where psychoacous-
tic modeling, borrowed from the MP3 compression algorithm,
was used to re-shape the perturbations of the adversarial ex-
amples in such a way as to hide the changes below the human
hearing thresholds [3]. However, the adversarial examples that
are created in that work need to be fed into the recognizer
directly, hence no end-to-end attack in an over-the-air setting
was possible.
Simultaneously, Abdullah et al. showed a black-box attack
in which psychoacoustics is used to empirically calculate
adversarial examples [6]. Their approach focuses on over-the-
air attacks, but in many cases, humans can perceive the hidden
message once they are alerted to its content.
As an extension of Carlini’s and Wagner’s attack [1],
Qin et al. introduced the first implementation of RIR-
independent adversarial examples [4]. Unfortunately, their
approach only worked in a simulated environment and not
for real over-the-air attacks, but the authors also utilize psy-
choacoustics to limit the perturbations.
Our approach is the first targeted attack that focuses on
RIR-independent robust adversarial examples and we demon-
strate how to generate adversarial examples which appear to
be mostly unaffected by the environment, as ascertained by
verifying their success in a broad range of room characteristics.
We utilize psychoacoustics to limit the perturbations of the
audio signal to remain under, or at least close to, the human
thresholds of hearing, and we show that the examples remain
robust to playback over the air.
C. Robust Adversarial Examples in the Visual Domain
In the visual domain, Evtimov et al. showed one of the first
real-world adversarial attacks [23]. They created and printed
stickers, which can be used to obfuscate traffic signs. For
humans, the stickers are visible. However, they seem very
inconspicuous and could possibly fool autonomous cars.
Athalye and Sutskever presented another real-world adver-
sarial perturbation on a 3D-printed turtle, which is recognized
as a rifle from almost every point of view [10]. The algorithm
to create this 3D object not only minimizes the distortion for
one image, but for all possible projections of a 3D object into
a 2D image.
In contrast to the visual domain, audio adversarial examples
are time-dependent and need to be considered as time series
signals, whereas images do not change over time, which makes
the calculation of adversarial audio signals algorithmically
more challenging. Our approach is capable of successfully
performing such an attack.
VI. DISCUSSION
The above results show that the SNRseg for the proposed
attack is lower in comparison to adversarial attacks that are
not hardened to work over the air. But while the mean SNRseg
is lower, we have been able to successfully create adversarial
examples which have SNRsegs beyond 14 dB for a real over-
the-air attack.
For an attacker, one successful adversarial example is
enough. Therefore, even is the WER are high, we have shown
that it is possible to create adversarial examples, which remain
robust after being replayed (WER of 0 %), with and without
restrictions via hearing thresholds.
In general, the results show a trade-off between the WER
and the SNRseg: if no hearing thresholds are used, the WER,
in general, is significantly better in comparison to the versions
with hearing thresholds. However, on the other hand, also if the
WER is better in cases where no hearing thresholds are used,
we have shown that it is indeed possible to calculate over-the-
air-robust adversarial examples with hearing thresholds. Those
adversarial examples contain less perceptible noise and are,
therefore, less likely to be detected by human listeners. As
another advantage, for the adversarial examples with hearing
thresholds, fewer examples had to be discarded due to artifacts.
The experiments in Table III show that the WER is the better
if the actual room geometry and the audio decay time T60 is
known. Specifically, the adversarial examples with θ2, which
uses a smaller range for the parameter distributions, have a
better WER. Therefore, the attack algorithm apparently tailors
the adversarial examples to the real room parameters.
On the other hand, the adversarial examples that are com-
puted for a specific room setup will likely be less successful, if
the properties of the room have changed. This can be observed
in Table IV, where we changed the room for the over-the-air
attack. As a results, the setup with θ2 was more successful in
Table III, but is outperformed by the θ1 setup in Table IV in
most of the cases.
The computation of robust adversarial examples is costly in
comparison to approaches, which are not tailored to work over
the air. This is mainly due to the fact that more iterations are
required because of the changing RIRs. However, by choosing
appropriate hyper-parameters, the run-time can be reduced,
e. g., by reducing the length M of the RIRs. The length M
barely affects the WER or the SNRseg, even when the results
with M = 1024 require a longer computation time.
Plotting the WER as a function of the number of iterations
shows that the WER might even decrease further after 2000
iterations. However, Figure 7 also indicates that due to the long
calculation time, it is not efficient to run for more iterations.
Instead one should try more audio files to obtain a specific
target transcription.
In a black-box scenario, the attacker has no access to the
ASR system. However, even for this more challenging attack,
it has been shown that it is possible to calculate adversarial
examples, but with the caveat that humans can perceive the
hidden transcription if they get aware of it. The proposed
approach is not easy to apply to black-box adversarial ex-
amples. However, it is feasible to use a similar approach
in combination with a parameter-stealing attack [24]–[28].
Once the attacker is able to rebuild her own system, which
reassembles the black-box system, the proposed algorithm can
be used with that system as well.
To prevent such an attack, an ASR system needs either some
kind of detection mechanism, or it needs a recognition that is
robust to adversarial examples. The detection of adversarial
examples for known attacks might be feasible. However, it
is not guaranteed that the detection will also work for new
approaches. Therefore, in the long term, it makes sense to
build the ASR system in such a way as to be adversarial-
example-robust, e. g., by mimicking the human perception of
speech similar to images encoded in jpeg format [29]. One
step in this direction can be to focus the ASR to only those
signal components that are perceptible to the human listener
as well, similar to the MP3 encoding. However, even in that
case, it will still be possible to create adversarial examples,
with the limitation that the perturbations are moved to human
perceptible areas of the audio.
Therefore, not only the input data should be considered, but
also the ASR, e. g., the DNN, itself. In the visual domain, a
first adversarial-example-robust recognizer has been proposed
and evaluated for MNIST data [30]. The approach synthesizes
each possible class of the output in respect to the input data
and then decides dependent on the synthesized versions. This
makes it very hard (or even impossible) to embed adversarial
distortions, as the input data will be replaced by a general
representation of the class.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated that ASR systems are
vulnerable against adversarial examples which are replayed
over the air. To this end, we have shown that it is possible
to calculate adversarial examples with a generic algorithm.
Compared to prior work on this topic, which used a fixed
setup only, our approach takes the characteristics of the room
and the position of the microphone and the loudspeaker into
account. By simulating varying RIRs during the calculation
of adversarial examples, we can create robust adversarial
examples, which can be played over the air. The examples can
be tailored to specific rooms, but also work, if a more general
setup is used or the room situation does change. To substan-
tiate our approach, we performed end-to-end attacks against
Kaldi, which uses a state-of-the-art DNN-HMM system and
presented the results of empirical attacks for different room
configurations. The algorithm can be used with and without
hearing thresholds, which limit the perturbations to be less
perceptible by humans. In both cases, we have shown that it
is possible to calculate robust adversarial examples.
Future work should investigate possible countermeasures
such as using only the perceptible areas of the audio or use
the DNN recognition itself, to be hardened against adversarial
examples.
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